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JURISDICTIONAL PROBLEMS BETWEEN
WASHINGTON'S WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT
AND FEDERAL LAW
JOHN D. LAWSON
Serious and confusing jurisdictional problems confront the com-
pensation lawyer in certain employment areas due to the supremacy
of federal law over interstate commerce and maritime matters.' Fed-
eral legislation concerning compensation for work-sustained injuries
has been enacted covering a variety of employments.2 To the extent
that the federal statute is applicable, state relief through its work-
men's compensation act cannot be given, due to the pre-emption by
federal law of the field. The perplexing problem for the practitioner
is that of determining the extent of pre-emption by the federal act,
and whether or not the injured workman was within the scope of
the federal statute when he was injured. The penalty for bringing a
claim under the wrong law will often be to have the claim barred by
the statute of limitations when the remedy is later sought under the
correct law. The expense of pursuing an improper remedy serves
as an additionaT penalty for making a wrong choice.
In this comment, the principal concern will be with the conflict
between the federal-law and the state act in respect to the railway
worker and the shoreline worker whose activity takes him upon navi-
gable waters of the United States. It is in these areas that the con-
fusion as to jurisdictional matters becomes the most difficult to resolve.
The applicable federal statutes are the Federal Employers' Liability
Act covering railroad employees, and the Longshoremen and Harbor
Worker's Act covering shoreline employees. The discussion in this
paper will be devoted to ascertaining the extent of federal pre-emption
and the area left in which the Washington Compensation Act may
be applied.'
The solution to the jurisdictional problems in these areas has not
1 By virtue of Art. I, § 8, of the United States Constitution, Congress is given the
power to "regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several states ...
Art. III, § 2, extends the judicial power ". . . to all cases of admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction . . ." in the federal courts. Congress has the power to make "necessary
and proper" laws to execute this grant.
2 Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C.A. §§ 51-60 (Railway employment in
interstate commerce) ; Jones Act, 46 U.S.C.A. § 688 (Maritime employment covering
seamen) ; Longshoremen and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 901-
950 (Martime employment covering "harbor workers"); United States Employee's
Compensation Act, 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 751 (Federal Employees).
8 In this regard emphasis will be placed upon the decisions of the final authority
upon the applicability of federal law, the United States Supreme Court. Washington
case law will be considered from the standpoint of predicting the probable treatment
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proven to be easy. The federal statutes involved do not give a clear
definition of the scope of the act, nor of the employment status cov-
ered. The court decisions interpreting the statutes have been equally
vague. Depending upon which relief, state or federal, is the more
favorable to the claimant at the time and place of the decision, the
courts have often strained to get the desired result. This distortive
process has lead to a complete lack of uniformity among the lower
federal and state court decisions. Decisions of the United States Su-
preme Court have not always adhered to employment characterizations
previously announced. As a result, there is no "rule of the thumb," no
"black letter law," nor any "majority rule" that can be followed.
The Washington legislature, appreciating the jurisdictional problems
posed by pre-emptive federal law in compensation areas, has attempted
to anticipate the conflict by declaring the state act inapplicable where
there is jurisdiction under a federal statute.4 To some extent the
Washington statute has made unnecessary the confusing distinctions
made in other jurisdictions in determining the status of the employ-
ment at the time of the injury in order to find jurisdiction. In other
respects, the attempt has only confused the situation further. The
effect of these provisions will be considered in the discussion to follow.
STATE JURISDICTION UNDER THE FEDERAL EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY ACT
A. The Extent Of The Federal Law. In 1908, after having an
earlier attempt declared unconstitutional for transcending the area of
intrastate commerce,' Congress passed the Federal Employers' Liabil-
ity Act, hereafter referred to as FELA.6 The act prior to 1939 covered
only those employees who at the time of their injury or death were
employed in interstate commerce. Relating the employment of the
workman to interstate commerce was done to avoid the constitutional
objection of the earlier act which encompassed both intra- and inter-
state commerce.
the Washington court will make in handling compensation claims in these fringe areas,
if it is indicated that Washington will follow a different rule than that predicted gen-
erally. No attempt will be made to rationalize the numerous and conflicting decisions
rendered in the lower federal courts and the courts of sister states beyond those which
deal with issues left unsettled by fhe federal Supreme Court and which indicate devel-
oping trends.
4 See RCW 51.12.060, .080, .090, .100.
& Employers' Liability Cases, 207 U.S. 463 (1908).
6 35 STAT. 65 (1909), 45 U.S.C.A. §§ 51-60, as amended by 36 STAT. 291 (1910), 45
U.S.C.A. §§ 56, 59, and by 53 STAT. 1404 (1939), 45 U.S.C.A. §§ 51, 54, 56, 60. The
constitutionality of this attempt was upheld in It re Second Employers' Liability
Cases, 223 U.S. 1 (1912).
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In Shanks v. Delaware, Lackawanna & Western Ry.,7 the test of
whether the injured employee was engaged in such commerce in the
sense intended by the act was said to be: "Was the employee at the
time of the injury engaged in interstate transportation or work so
closely related to it as to be practically a part of it?" This lead to a
fertile area of litigation, pin-pointing the worker's employment status
at the time of the injury.' The employee had to be engaged in interstate
transportation as distinguished from activities of the railroad not con-
nected to the actual transportation part of its business in order to get
relief under the federal act. He had to be so engaged at the time of
his injury.' Many fine distinctions were drawn in the myriad of appel-
late cases applying the test when making determinations of whether
state or federal law should be applicable.' ° A discussion of these cases
would be fruitless in light of the 1939 amendment which redefined
the coverage of the act. The Shanks case is mentioned in order to see
the extent to which the old guides are now obsolete.
The 1939 amendment added an important paragraph to the first
section of the FELA. Employees under the act are now defined as:
Any employee of a carrier, any part of whose duties as such employee
shall be the furtherance of interstate or foreign commerce; or shall in
any way directly or closely and substantially affect such commerce
... shall, for the purpose of this Chapter, be considered as being em-
ployed by such carrier in such commerce and shall be considered as
entitled to the benefits of this Chapter. (Emphasis added)"
This amendment, cast in language recently used by the Supreme Court
in a case involving the expanded powers of federal commerce, 2 has
been interpreted as broadening the coverage of the FELA.3 The extent
7239 U.S. 556 (1916).8 See, for example, the cases cited in Horovitz, Federal Supremacy in Five Work-
man's Compensation Problems, 24 BosToN U. L. REv. 109, 129-134 (1944).
SThese came to be known under various labels, such as the "pin-pointe' test, and
the "transportation" test. See 2 LARSON, WORKMAN'S COMPENSATION 430 (1952).
10 The United States Supreme Court was the final arbitrator in 43 cases concerning
the line to be drawn between between interstate and intrastate injuries out of 172
FELA cases in the first 25 years of litigation. 47 HARv. L. REv. 394, 398 (1934).
"153 STAT. 1404 (1939), 45 U.S.C.A. § 51.
12 NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). This case, involving
labor relations, greatly broadened the interpretation given to the powers of Congress
over interstate commerce to include activities which'had a substantial effect upon that
commerce. The ultimate in the expanded powers was reached in Wickard v. Filburn,
317 U.S. 111 (1942), where the growing of wheat for consumption on the farm produc-
ing it was said to "exert a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce" suffi-
cient enough to be subjected to federal control.
"3 Baird v. New York Central R. Co., 299 N.Y. 213, 86 N.E.2d 567 (1949). In the
Senate Reports, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., Report No. 661, the following appears:
This amendment is intended to broaden the scope of the Employers' Liability
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to which its coverage now pre-empts state compensation acts is cur-
rently being carved out by the Supreme Court.
Until recent years, the United States Supreme Court has maintained
a studied silence, evidently content to allow the lower courts to wrestle
with the problem."4 But in two recent cases, Southern Pacific Co. v.
Gileo" and Reed v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co.,"0 the Supreme Court
has virtually rendered the old tests obsolete. By implication, conflicting
decisions in the lower courts have been overruled by the new interpre-
tation given to the amendment.
The Gileo case involved five California cases which were consolidated
for review.' At the time of the injury, the workmen concerned were
each working on "new construction" for the railroad carrier.' The
court held that the provisions of FELA and not the state act were
applicable:
... Congress enacted [the 1939 amendment] to cure the evils of hyper-
technical distinctions which had developed in over thirty years of
FELA litigation. Whatever justification there may have been before
the amendment for holding that employees working on repairs of a
railroad's instrumentalities were engaged in interstate commerce and
therefore entitled to the benefits of the Act . . . while those who were
working on construction of new railroad facilities were not engaged in
interstate commerce and therefore were not covered by the Act ...
has been swept away by the 1939 amendment.' 9
The court, in disposing of the cases, indicated that if any part of the
duties of the employee is a "vital link in the chain of [the railroad's]
function as an interstate rail carrier," his employment will be held to
further interstate commerce and directly or closely and substantially
affect such commerce. Instead of requiring that the employee be en-
gaged in interstate commerce at the time of the injury as required by
the Shanks case,2" the new test is whether any part of the duties of
Act so as to include within its provisions employees of common carriers
who, while ordinarily engaged in the transportation of interstate com-
merce, may be, at the time of injury, temporarily divorced therefrom and
engaged in intrastate operations.
14This writer has been unable to find a Supreme Court case construing the amend-
ment between 1939 and 1955.
15351 U.S. 493 (1956).
16351 U.S. 502 (1956).
17 The writs in two of the cases were dismissed for lack of finality of judgment in
the highest court of the state.
' "New construction" had been held not to be an employment in interstate com-
merce prior to the 1939 amendment. Raymond v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul R.
Co., 243 U.S. 43 (1917); New York Central R. Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917).
10 Supra note 15, 351 U.S. at 499.
20 Note 7, supra.
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the employee are in furtherance of the interstate commerce activity of
the railroad. The "pin-point" test formerly used now seems to be a
completely dead issue. Uniformity of treatment is thus assured of
workmen whose total activities "further" interstate commerce regard-
less of how they may be employed at the moment of injury.
The Reed case,2' a companion case to Gileo, discarded the other
distinction previously used in distinguishing "transportation" em-
ployees from employees having no part of their employment connected
with the transportation end of the carrier's business. The claimant in
this case was a clerical employee. Her duties consisted of filing blue-
print tracings and using them to fill orders for blueprints anywhere
in the railroad's system. Her entire duties took place within the office
building where she worked. She was held to be entitled to coverage
under FELA. "The benefits of the Act are not limited to those who
have cinders in their hair, soot on their faces, or callouses on their
hands."
The argument that commerce in the act means transportation and
that the claimant was not engaged in transportation was rejected. The
court said that if any part of the employee's duties furthers or sub-
stantially affects interstate commerce, it also furthers or substantially
affects interstate transportation. The test for coverage under the amend-
ment "is not whether the employee is engaged in transportation, but
rather whether what he does in any way furthers, or substantially affects
transportation." The court found that the very purpose of the claim-
ant's employment was to further the physical maintenance of an inter-
state railroad system and that her duties contributed to that purpose.
The Reed case should be interpreted as removing all distinction be-
tween the different employment classes of the railroad. Back shop
workers, clerical help, restaurant people and other employees in the
railroad's system would be covered if the test of the Reed case is met,
i.e., do their duties in any way further or substantially affect the inter-
state business of transportation carried on by the railroad? The Reed
opinion was quick to note that the word "furtherance" is a broad and
elastic term and can only be marked out through case-by-case adjudi-
cation.
As now construed by the Gileo and Reed cases, the area left for the
application of state complensation acts in the case of railroad employees
is quite narrow. Under the Gileo test, any phase of work may be found
21 Note 17, supra.
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to have a sufficient relationship to interstate commerce" and be cov-
ered by FELA. Certainly the construction of railroad facilities are now
covered where done by employees of the carrier, and it is enough if
any part of their duties have the requisite effect. The Reed case removes
distinctions previously made between the classes of employees. The
provisions of FELA would now seem to be applicable to all employees
on the payroll of the railroad who contribute in any way toward the
"furtherance" of the railroad's commerce activity.
Apparently the state act could still be validly applied to railroads
engaged solely in intrastate activities. To find such a railroad today
would be rare. Even though its lines are wholly within the state, such
a railroad would probably connect with an interstate railroad or carry
goods destined for shipment without the state. Under the expanded
view of interstate commerce, it may be doubted if even a railroad en-
gaged wholly in intrastate activities would be excluded from the provi-
sions of FELA.
B. When Can The Washington Act Be Applied? Washington is
one of several jurisdictions which have sought to avoid conflict with
FELA by statutory provisions in its Workmen's Compensation Act.2"
The Washington provision places all railroad employees outside the
state act, except those engaged in railroad construction work.2" Rail-
way workers not engaged in interstate commerce (those in intrastate
activities) are to be given the same right of recovery as may exist for
included employees under FELA. Railroads engaged in traditional in-
trastate enterprises (street railways or power plants) are still subject
to the state act.
Under this statutory language, the distinctions made in other juris-
dictions and in Washington, would be determinative only of whether
the claimant had a state cause of action based on the provisions of
FELA or a federal FELA cause of action. The recovery would be the
same. Uniformity of treatment among the railway workers would thus
be achieved."
2L Or "transportation" if you prefer. The Gileo and Reed cases indicate that in the
Supreme Court's thinking, they now mean the same thing in the case of commerce by
railroads.
23 RCW 51.12.080. Other jurisdictions include Idaho, Connecticut, Illinois, New
York, Louisiana, Maryland, Nebraska, Tennessee, Utah, and West Virginia.
24 Presumably, this was intended to mean "new" construction work as distinguished
from the repair of existing railroad facilities. Cf. Prink v. Longview, Portland &
Northern R. Co., 153 Wash. 300, 279 Pac. 1115 (1929).
25 Under the Washington statute, every injured railway workman, not engaged in
"new" construction, would receive the benefits of the FELA provisions regardless of
how he was employed at the moment of injury.
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Under the Gileo and Reed cases, the function played by the Wash-
ington statutory provision no longer will be needed. Uniformity of
treatment is assured by pre-emption of state relief for all classes of
railway workers. Even employees engaged in the construction of "new"
railroad facilities are now covered by FELA. If any part of the duties
of the injured employee contributes toward the interstate business of
the railroad, the Washington act is inapplicable. Resort must be had
to the federal cause of action embodied in FELA.
The Washington practitioner representing a railroad compensation
claimant today would be well-advised to bring his cause of action under
the provisions of FELA regardless of the class of employment or how
the employee was engaged at the moment of injury. All that would be
necessary is that the employee be engaged in some activity "furthering"
the interstate commerce activity of the railroad.
STATE JURISDICTION UNDER THE FEDERAL LONGSHOREMIEN'S ACT
A. The Extent Of The Federal Law. The jurisdictional problems
under this heading involve shore-based workmen whose employments
take them upon navigable waters of the United States. The principal
concern in this relation will be with the longshoremen and harbor work-
ers other than seamen, seamen being in a category all of their own.
2 1
The jurisdictional problem there between state or federal relief involves
the problem of characterization.27 If the workmen are found to be "sea-
men" according to some nebulous formula, the jurisdictional problem
is solved.28 "Seamen" are the "wards of the admiralty," and are to be
26 "Seamen" have traditional remedies under admiralty law. The oldest is that of
maintenance and cure. See Calmar S. S. Corp. v. Taylor, 303 U.S. 525 (1938).
Another of the traditional remedies is that of indemnity for the unseaworthiness of
the ship or a condition thereon. The Jones Act gives the seaman a statutory remedy
in negligence based on the FELA provisions to complete the scope of seamen remedies.
41 STAT. 1007 (1920), 46 U.S.C.A. § 688. For a complete and excellent discussion of
the rights of seamen modernly, see GILMORE AND BLACK, LAW OF ADmIRALTY, 249-333
(1957). See also The Tangled Siene: A Survey of Maritime Personal Injury Reme-
dies, 57 YALE L. J. 243 (1947); Howe, Rights of Maritime Workers, 5 NACCA L. J.
146 and 6 NACCA L. J. 131 (1950).
27 Determining who is a "seaman" in a given case is one of the disturbing problems
of the admiralty bar. Many shore-based employees who would not seem to fit the con-
cept of the term "seaman" have been afforded some, but not all, of the seamen
remedies. This took place during the period of time when "seamen" remedies were
more favorable than those provided harbormen. See International Stevedoring Co. v.
Haverty, 272 U.S. 50 (1926) (Longshoremen as "seamen" for purposes of Jones Act
relief) ; Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946) ("seamen" in order to
recover indemnity for unseaworthiness). See also, Ambler, Seamen are "Wards of
The Admiralty" But Longshoremen Are Now More Privileged, 29 WASHa. L. REv.
243 (1955).2 8 The holding in Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917), makes clear
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accorded federal relief." The state is incompetent to act in regards to
these workmen due to the federal pre-emption by federal law.
The position of the harbor worker is much less certain. For a time,
the states felt competent to apply their compensation acts to this
class of workmen. Even though the contract was maritime and the
injury occurred upon navigable waters, the interest of the states in
these land-based employees was thought to be sufficient. Seemingly,
there could be no "undue burden" upon admiralty law by regulating in
regards to an injury in the absence of federal legislation. The burden
would be incidental at best, and the interest of the state in the welfare
of its citizens would be a legitimate reason for state action. Until Con-
gress had legislated, there would seem to be no bar to state action in
regard to these injuries.
Unfortunately the Supreme Court of the United States did not agree.
The case of Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen,"0 established that uniformity
must be preserved in the maritime law, and this included compensation
for injuries. The court said that where the contract of employment is
maritime and the locus of the injury is upon navigable waters, only
those remedies under federal maritime law can be applied.
Following the Jensen decision, the courts and Congress were busy
attempting to find ways to avoid the harshness of the uniformity rule.
Congress twice attempted to overrule the Jensen result by expressly
making state compensation acts applicable to these workmen."' Both
attempts were held unconstitutional."' Then the courts gradually
that injuries sustained upon navigable waters come within the exclusive province of
the federal maritime law. Seamen are to be afforded the federal admiralty remedies
whther injured on land or sea. See GILMoRE AND BLACK, op. cit. supra note 26.
29 As seen above, in the case of a railway worker the question of federal or state
relief is determined by how the workman was occupied. In the case of "seaman," once
the workman is classified in that favored class, the jurisdiction problem is solved with-
out regard to what the workman was doing.
30244 U.S. 205 (1917). The New York Compensation Act was found to work
"material prejudice to the characteristic features of the general maritime law" and
to interfere "with the proper harmony and uniformity of that law in its international
and interstate relations." The Court used as its authority for the theory of uniformity
The Lottawanna, 88 U.S. (21 Wall 558) 470 (1874), a case which held that state
legislatures had the power to modify the maritime law by creating liens, enforceable
in admiralty.
31 First in 1917, the "saving to suitors" clause was amended by adding a phrase:
.... to claimants the rights and remedies under the workmen's compensation law of
any state." Act of 1917, 40 STAT. 395. Then in 1922, this clause was again amended,
this time expressly-exempting seamen. Act of 1922, 42 STAT. 634.
82 The act of 1917 was held to be an unconstitutional delegation of powers. Knicker-
bocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 (1920). The act of 1922 was held unconstitu-
tional in State of Washington v. W. C. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219 (1924).
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carved out a "maritime but local" exception to the Jensen rule, in
which cases the state act could be constitutionally applied."
Finally Congress yielded, and in 1927 passed the Longshoremen's
and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act." The reluctance of Congress
to pre-empt the field is manifested by their making the Federal Act
apply only "if recovery for the disability or death through workmen's
compensation proceedings may not validly be provided by state law.'"'
The act contains certain limitations in its coverage which have
produced litigation in addition to the provisions limiting the act's appli-
cability to cases where state relief would be invalid. Only injuries
occurring upon navigable waters (including dry docks) are covered
by the act.3" Thus injuries occurring upon the land to harbor workers
may be constitutionally covered by the state act. Also, the Longshore-
men's Act does not apply to a "master or member of a crew of any
vessel.""s? Seamen are thus excluded from compensation-type relief and
have their remedies provided only under the admiralty law.
For several years after the passage of the Longshoremen's Act, the
courts continued to draw distinctions based upon the "maritime but
local" doctrine. Then in Motor Boat Sales v. Parker," the Supreme
Court apparently tired of the game. In this case, a janitor-handyman
for a marine store took it upon himself to go along on a trip to test an
outboard motor. This was not one of his usual duties, which normally
took place upon the land. The boat capsized upon maritime waters and
the man was drowned. The Supreme Court held that relief under the
Longshoremen's Act was proper and reversed the circuit court's finding
33 This exception was first developed in Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 U.S. 233
(1921), and then applied to the field of compensation by Grant Smith-Porter Ship Co.
v. Rhode, 257 U.S. 469 (1922). Under the exception, if a subject were local enough in
character it would be held not to interfere with "the proper harmony and uniformity"
of the maritime law to allow state relief, even though the subject were maritime. The
development of this doctrine and its many applications has an interesting history. See
GILMORE AND BLACK, LAW OF ADMIRALTY (1957).
34 44 STAT. 1424 (1927), 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 901-950. Constitutionality was upheld in
Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932). The act is a compensation-type act modeled
after the New York act. 2 LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 89.10 (1952).
3544 STAT. 1426, 33 U.S.C.A. § 903(a). See GILMORE AND BLACK, LAW OF ADmR-
ALTY, 337 (1957), for a summary of the substantive provisions of the act.
3833 U.S.C.A. § 903 (a) The requirement of the injury occurring upon navigable
water has led to narrow distinctions being made in pin-pointing the locus of the injury.
Thus in T. Smith & Son, Inc., 276 U.S. 179 (1930), an injury was held to have
occurred on land when a longshoreman standing on a dock was knocked into navigable
water has led to narrow distinctions being made in pin-pointing the locus of the injury.
In Minnie v. Port Huron Terminal, 295 U.S. 647 (1935), the impact causing the injury
was held to have taken place upon navigable waters when a land operated crane
knocked a workman standing upon the deck of a vessel onto the land. The state act
was held to be inapplicable.
3733 U.S.C.A. § 903(a) (1).
38314 U.S. 244 (1941).
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that the employment was a matter of local concern only. Compensation
had been originally sought under the federal act and the deputy com-
missioner had granted relief. Possibly the Supreme Court had in mind
administrative finality in the finding of federal jurisdiction.
One year later the Supreme Court announced its decision in the well-
known case of Davis v. Department of Labor and Industries." In this
case the maritime but local exception was not used, although possibly
it could have been. Instead, the Supreme Court announced its now
famous "twilight" doctrine:
There is, in the light of the cases referred to, clearly a twilight zone
in which the employees must have their rights determined case by case
and in which particular facts and circumstances are vital elements.
As an answer to the confusing jurisdictional problem previously
existing, Justice Black made use of an old principle of law: that there
is a presumption of constitutionality when the validity of a state
statute is drawn into question. Justice Black said:
Under all the circumstances of this case, we will rely on the presumption
of constitutionality in favor of the state enactment; for any contrary
decision results in our holding the Washington Act unconstitutional
as applied to petitioner. A conclusion of unconstitutionality of a state
statute can not be rested on so hazardous a factual foundation."'
Thus, under the twilight approach, the claimant in a borderline em-
ployment status will probably be successful if he applies for state
relief. In such a situation, the jurisdiction of the state to apply its act
would be accorded a "presumption of constitutionality."
How does this "twilight zone" approach work where jurisdiction is
first sought under the federal law? Quite possibly the answer may be
found in the Longshoremen's Act itself. Coverage under the federal
act is exclusive once a determination has been made that it is appli-
cable."1 The federal authorities are the determiners so far as questions
involving the supremacy of federal law may be concerned. This would
be true where the decision is made by the federal court, whether the
issue is one of law or of fact. It would also be true where the decision
is made by the federal administrative agency and the issue is one of
so317 U.S. 249 (1942).
to 317 U.S. at 256.
41 This is on the reasoning that the congressional legislation pre-empts state relief
in the area covered. Since the act provides relief only if a state may not validly pro-
vide compensation, it follows that a determination of the applicability of federal relief
necessarily is also a determination that state relief "may not validly be provided."
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fact. Since the Longshoremen's Act provides that jurisdiction is to be
"... presumed in the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary,"
' 2
it follows that the finding by the federal agency is to be accorded final-
ity unless it is not supported by substantial evidence. 3 Administrative
finality in this regard would mean that a determination of jurisdiction
by the deputy commissioner would be conclusive of federal jurisdic-
tion.4 The Davis case itself bears out this thinking. There it is said
that the court will give ". . . presumptive weight to the conclusions of
the appropriate federal authorities . . ." Thus it would seem that a
finding of jurisdiction by either the federal agency or a federal court
would be given a presumption of validity by the United States Supreme
Court." Similarly, a finding by these federal authorities that jurisdic-
tion did not lie under the federal act would also be accorded a presump-
tion of validity.
The Davis case leaves one vital question unanswered. Granted that
a presumption of constitutionality of state statutes and of administra-
tive finality is to be accorded in twilight cases, what types of employ-
ment are to be classed as sufficiently borderline to come within the
twilight zone? Do past decisions, which have characterized a particular
employment as coming within a state (or federal) law, take the case
out of the doubtful area? The Davis case indicated that the unconsti-
tutionality of a state statute cannot be made to rest upon a "hazardous
factual foundation." This would seem to indicate that the twilight
approach would not be used where precedents have already determined
the factual situation as being within federal or state compensation and
thus not a hazardous factual pattern.
The Supreme Court, however, has ruled that this is not the case.
In Moore's Case, the Massachusetts court found repair work upon a
completed vessel would come within the provisions of its compensation
act." The state judge recognized the futility of attempting to reason
logically about "illogic." The Davis case was held to include doubtful
cases involving aspects pertaining both to land and navigable water
42 33 U.S.C.A. § 920.
43 Cf. Universal Camera Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 340 U.S. 474 (1951), and the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act, 60 STAT. 237 (1946), 5 U.S.C.A. § 1001 et seq. But cf.
Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
44 See in this regard, the discussion in Rodes, Workmen's Compensation for Afari-
time Employees: Obscurity in the Twilight Zone, 68 HARv. L. REv. 637, 644 (1955).
45 See Avondale Marine Ways, Inc. v. Henderson, 201 F.2d 437 (5th Cir. 1953),
aff'd per curiam, 246 U.S. 366 (1953).
46 322 Mass. 462, 80 N.E.2d 478 (1948). Previously, this type of work was exclu-
sively maritime and did not come within the "maritime but local" exception. John
Baizley Iron Works v. Span, 281 U.S. 222 (1930).
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and precedents were not to be controlling. The federal Supreme Court
affirmed in a per curiam decision.4T
In Baskin v. Industrial Accident Commission," the California court
reached an opposite result. This time the Supreme Court reversed in
another per curiam decision, citing Moore's Case.9 Thus it would seem
that the "twilight" doctrine covers a wide range of cases, and earlier
cases will not operate to take a case out of the doubtful or "twilight"
area. Under the Davis case, then, the claimant's award of compensation
under either federal or state law would be accorded a presumption
of validity.
It may be argued that this means that the state and federal powers
now enjoy concurrent jurisdiction in this field. This conclusion would
seem to follow whenever relief has been granted, since the presumption
of constitutionality of the state statute or the presumption of adminis-
trative finality under the federal law would go to validate the award.
In the case of a denial by the state authorities of state compensation,
a different result might be reached. Such a finding would not necessarily
be conclusive in denying state jurisdiction. The federal authorities,
determining the extent of federal pre-emption might decide otherwise.0
However, a denial by the federal authorities of a claim would seem to
be conclusive so far as the constitutional power of a state to entertain
a claim is concerned. Thus federal jurisdiction is concurrent with state
jurisdiction, if the federal authorities so decide,5 but state jurisdiction
is not necessarily concurrent with federal.
If we have a type of concurrent jurisdiction, may successive awards
be made? The United States Supreme Court has not yet answered this
question. Arguably, an award made under a state act would not be
conclusive as to a possible second award under the Longshoremen's Act.
The federal authorities would not be bound by the findings of the state
authorities concerning a question of the extent of federal pre-emption.
The federal authorities could make a determination that the claim
47 Bethlehem Steel Co. v. Moores, 335 U.S. 874 (1948).
48 89 Cal. App.2d 632, 201 P.2d 549 (1949).
49 Baskin v. Industrial Accident Comm., 338 U.S. 854 (1949).
ro Conceivably, this could happen two ways. The denial by the state authorities
could be appealed to the federal courts who might then reverse the state's finding
against the presumption of constitutionality. Or, the claimant might seek relief under
the federal act and be told by the federal agency that the state should have applied
its act.
51 In state vs. state compensation conflicts apparently there is now full concurrent
jurisdiction between the states to apply their acts. Industrial Commission of Wisconsin
v. McCartin, 330 U.S. 622 (1947). There equal powers exist "Less than concurrent"jurisdiction between state and federal powers must necessarily exist because of the
supremacy of the latter power.
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came under federal law and that the state act could not be constitu-
tionally applied due to federal pre-emption. Of course, the state award
would be credited on the federal award.
Such a result was reached in Western Boat Building Co. v. O'Leary,
a ninth circuit case." Here the injured workman had been repairing
a tugboat on a marine railway. The state commissioner allowed an
award under the Washington act and monthly payments were made.
The claimant then filed a claim under the Longshoremen's Act. The
deputy commissioner allowed the claim and made the award. The dis-
trict court affirmed. The marine railway was held to be a "dry dock,"
bringing the injury under the federal act." The federal agency has
jurisdiction even though the state agency has adjudicated the question.
This means that awards may be made by both agencies and the federal
court will decide the conflict."'
A federal award followed by a state claim would probably be denied."
Here a finding of jurisdiction by the federal authorities would be con-
clusive as to the jurisdiction of state relief.
B. When Can The Washington Act Be Applied? RCW 51.12.100
provides:
The provisions of this title shall apply to all employers and workmen
except a master or member of a crew of any vessel, engaged in maritime
occupation for whom no right or obligation exists under the maritime
laws for personal injuries of such workmen. (Emphasis added)
This was enacted after the Longshoremen's Act's provision that the
federal act will only apply where a state act may not be validly applied.
The Washington provision makes the state act applicable, unless the
federal act will be applied. Therefore the controlling question is
whether the federal act is applicable to a particular set of facts, and
thus pre-emptive of state relief.
The answer to this question lies in the decisions of the Supreme
Court discussed above. The Washington practitioner will probably find
that the federal act will be pre-emptive only in those cases where juris-
diction is sought first under federal law and the federal authorities
decide the jurisdictional question. An award granted by the state au-
52198 F.2d 409 (9th Cir. 1952).
5 See also Maryland Casualty Co. v. Lawson, 101 F.2d 732 (5th Cir. 1939).
54 See Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. O'Hearne, 192 F.2d 968,
971 (4th Cir. 1951).
55 See Dunleavy v. Tietzen & Lang Dry Docks, 17 N.J. Super. 76, 85 A.2d 343, aff'd
20 N.J. Super. 486, 90 A.2d 84 (1951).
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thorities, will probably be upheld due to the presumption of the state
statute under which the award was made being constitutional.
Washington has made clear that one qualification will be applied in
the case of shore-based employees before they will be held to come
within the provisions of the federal maritime law. The employee must
be engaged in a martime service when he suffers injury upon navigable
waters to come within the provisions of federal law?3 This may be
another way of applying the local concern rule. It will serve, however,
to include those employees within the state act, who are not engaged in
a maritime venture at the time of the injury."
Those employees engaged in work of a maritime nature would come
within the concurrent jurisdiction situation discussed above. The claim-
ant could file under either the Washington act or under the federal act,
and would probably be upheld in his choice of jurisdiction.
ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
Mention should be made of interstate commerce activities other than
railroads and the jurisdictional state-federal problems concerning in-
juries in those areas. Some preliminary observations pertaining to the
relative powers of state and federal governments in the field of inter-
state commerce will point out the respective role each plays.
Constitutionally, a state may validly provide compensation for the
injuries or death of an employee engaged in interstate commerce in the
absence of federal legislation on the subject. 8 Although congressional
power over interstate commerce is admittedly broad, 8 the state's inter-
est in the welfare of its residents is sufficient to justify the exercise of
its police power over these injuries."0 Lacking federal legislation over
66 Puget Sound Bridge & Dredging Co. v. Dept. of Labor & Industries, 185 Wash.
349, 54 P.2d 1003 (1936).
67 Examples of non-maritime service: Sulton Railway & Timber Co. v. Dept. of
Labor & Industries, 141 Wash. 172, 251 Pac. 130 (1926), aff'd 277 U.S. 135 (1926)
(booming of logs into rafts preparing them for towing-logs have not yet entered into
interstate commerce) ; Eclipse Mill Co. v. Dept. of Labor & Industries, 141 Wash.
172, 251 Pac. 130 (1926) (breaking up of log rafts-logs have left interstate naviga-
tion). In the Puget Sound Dredging case, supra note 56, the court said that dredging
is maritime service only if its purpose is to aid navigation.
58 Schosboek v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific R., 188 Wash. 672, 63 P.2d
477 (1936) ; State ex rel. Washington Motor Coach Co. v. Kelly, 192 Wash. 394, 74
P.2d 16 (1937). Cf. Gilvary v. Cugahaga Valley R. Co., 292 U.S. 57 (1934); Valley
Steamship Co. v. Wattawa, 244 U.S. 202 (1917).
'' Note 12, supra.8 0Boston & M. R. Co. v. Armburg, 285 U.S. 234 (1932).
19581
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
these employment relations, then, a state may validly apply its work-
men's compensation act in the field of interstate commerce. 1
Appreciating the difficulties caused by FELA upon the application of
a state compensation act, the Washington legislature attempted to
anticipate the possibility of federal legislation in other commerce areas
as to injuries. The purpose was to alleviate any possible conflict which
might result. This thinking into the future has produced some present
day problems. The statute provides that the provisions of Washington's
Workmen's Compensation Act:
... shall apply to employers and workmen (other than in railways and
their workmen) engaged in intrastate and also in interstate or foreign
commerce, for whom a rule of liability or method of compensation now
exists under or may hereafter be established by the congress of the
United States, only to the extent that the payroll of such workmen
may and shall be clearly separable and distinguishable from the pay-
roll of workmen engaged in interstate or foreign commerce: Provided,
That as to workmen whose payrolls are not so clearly separable and
distinguishable the employer shall in all cases be liable in damages for
injuries to the same extent and under the same circumstances as is
specified in the case of railroads in the first proviso of RCW 51.12.080.
(Emphasis added) '
The statute is ambiguous in several respects. For example, suppose
the Congress amends the Motor Carrier's Act to provide compensation
for injuries in that field of commerce. Suppose also that the payrolls of
the workmen are not clearly separable. Does the statute mean that the
employees could then collect damages for injuries upon the same
grounds as are contained in FELA? A literal reading of the statute
would indicate this result. Yet this would destroy the uniformity of
treatment to workers in this field. Some would receive a compensation
type relief, while others would receive a liability type recovery. In
order to assure uniformity of treatment, the statute would have to be
interpreted to mean that relief would be given upon the same grounds
as is specified in the newly-enacted federal statute, as is now done in
the case of railroads. In other words, if the future federal statute were
a compensation type, employees not included therein would receive
state relief to the same extent as provided by the federal compensa-
61 It might be noted that interstate commerce is not restricted to interstate trans-
portation. Paying premiums into a state's industrial insurance fund constitutes just as
much a burden on interstate activities other than transportation, e.g. a factory selling
products without the state, as it does upon interstate transportation. Admittedly, the
burden is incidental and not direct.
62 RCW 51.12.090.
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tion statute. This interpretation, while doing violence to the incorpora-
tion method employed by the draftsman, is to be preferred. Uniformity
would be assured to all workmen within the same general employment
group.
Another ambiguity has already been discovered and construed by
the Washington Supreme Court. In State ex rel. Washington Motor
Coach Co. v. Kelly,6 employers engaged in motor transportation sought
to compel the Director of Labor and Industries to accept premiums
into the state Industrial Insurance Fund on the accounts of certain of
their employees. The director contended that no payroll segregation
could be made of the intrastate and interstate activities of the em-
ployees. He also contended that the Motor Carriers Act,"4 enacted by
Congress, pre-empted the field of interstate transportation. The Wash-
ington court found that in the absence of federal legislation upon the
subject of injuries, a state could validly cover employers in interstate
commerce by enactment of a state compensation act. The Motor Car-
riers Act did not purport to cover liability for injuries and thus was
held not to pre-empt state power in this regard. The state act did pur-
port to cover motor carriers within the extrahazardous employments
covered by workmen's compensation.65 Therefore, the court concluded,
unless the provision contained in RCW 51.12.090 excluded this em-
ployment, it was covered by the Washington act. The court said that:
... the interstate employees excluded from the operation of the sec-
tion were those only . . . for whom a rule of liability or method of
compensation has been or may be established by the Congress of the
United States .... (Italics by the court)
Since no "rule of liability or method of compensation" had been estab-
lished by the Congress in regard to these employees, RCW 51.12.090
could not be applicable in this case. The court concluded that the
employees engaged in motor transportation, whether intrastate or inter-
state commerce, were covered by the Washington act. The court made
no holding as to whether segregation of payrolls could be made in this
case or not, since its finding meant that all employees were covered.
Seventeen years later, the court again construed the statute under
consideration in the case of McClung v. Pratt.66 Here an Oregon truck
driver, employed by an Oregon resident, negligently collided with an
83 192 Wash. 394, 74 P.2d 16 (1937).
6449 STAT. 543, 49 U.S.C.A. (Supp.) § 302.
65 LAWS 1937, c. 211, § 1.
as 44 Wn.2d 779, 270 P.2d 1063 (1954).
1958]
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
industrial inter-plant bus in Seattle. The occupants of the bus were
injured and brought a common law action against the truck driver and
the owner of the truck. At the time of the accident the truck was en-
gaged solely in interstate commerce. The defendants contended that
under RCW 51.24.010, they were immune from a common law action.6"
Truck driving is covered as an enumerated extrahazardous employ-
ment under the act." The court rejected this contention and held that
these defendants were not subject to the provisions of the act and
could be subjected to a common law suit.
The Washington Motor Coach case was distinguished as holding that
employments concerning both intrastate and interstate commerce were
covered, not employments concerning only interstate commerce. "The
language used must be confined to the facts before the court in that
case." The court in the Pratt case emphasized the conjunctive form of
the words used in RCW 51.12.090. "By its plain terms, the statute
makes our workmen's compensation act apply only to employers and
workmen . . . engaged in intrastate and also in interstate or foreign
commerce." Since the defendants were engaged only in interstate com-
merce, the court held that the statute dos not purport to cover them.
The court also said that the separability limitation contained in the
statute bore out its holding. Employees engaged wholly in intrastate
commerce were said to be excluded but were covered by another part
of the act. Is this reasoning sound? Employees engaged wholly in
interstate commerce may be excluded by this section, but it would
seem that they too are included by another section of the act."9 The
court noted that it did not intend to hold that the legislature did not
have the power to include interstate employers but that the statute
did not purport to include them. The court does not seem to give effect
to the part of the section italicized above, limiting its application only
to cases where federal legislation has established a method of liability
or compensation. If such a federal statute has not been enacted, it would
seem that RCW 51.12.090 is inapplicable, and the other provisions of
Washington's Workmen's Compensation Act should apply. It is sub-
mitted that the court's reasoning is erroneous. Had the truck carried
67 RCW 51.24.010 provides that employees covered by workmen's compensation,
when injured by a third party, may elect whether to take under the Act or seek a
common law remedy against the third party ". . . Provided, however, That no action
may be brought against any employer or workman under this Act as a third person if
at the time of the accident such employer or such workman was in the course of any
extra-hazardous employment under this Act." (Emphasis added.)
6s RCW 51.12.010.
09 Ibid.
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only one item in intrastate commerce, the defendants would have been
covered by the statute. Surely this was not the legislative intent.
CONCLUSIONS
Jurisdictional problems between state and federal law in the injury
area do not as yet have a suitable solution. Only further clarification
by the United States Supreme Court will enable the practitioner to
know, with any degree of accuracy, under which law he should file his
claim. The present thinking of the Supreme Court seems to be that of
upholding the jurisdiction first invoked by the injured claimant, or
that of further clarifying the extent of pre-emption by the federal
statute.
In the case of railway workmen, this means FELA relief almost ex-
clusively. The Reed and Gileo cases include virtually all the workmen
of an interstate railway under the provisions of the federal act. Only a
wholly intrastate railway enterprise could be covered by the state act
due to federal pre-emption of any activity which in any way furthers or
substantially or materially affects interstate commerce.
Shore-based workmen who work upon navigable waters, other than
"cseamen," will probably be upheld in their choice of jurisdiction under
either federal or state statutes. If their choice is state relief, the pre-
sumption of constitutionality to be afforded a state statute will serve
to uphold the claim. If the choice is federal relief, the administrative
finality to be afforded questions of fact will serve here to uphold the
federal award. The "twilight" jurisdiction of state and federal law con-
cerning these workmen seems to be moving toward a limited type of
concurrent jurisdiction. Federal law can probably be applied and a
successive award following a state award may be granted if the federal
authorities decide that the state was without jurisdiction due to federal
pre-emption. The reverse (federal award followed by a state award)
will not probably be granted.
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